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Testing Market Equilibrium:
Is Cointegration Informative?
Kevin  McNew  and Paul L. Fackler
Cointegration  methods  are increasingly  used  to  test  for market  efficiency  and  inte-
gration.  The economic rationale  for these  tests, however,  is generally  unclear.  Using
a simple spatial equilibrium model to  simulate equilibrium price behavior, it is shown
that prices  in  a  well-integrated,  efficient  market need  not be  cointegrated.  Further-
more, the number  of cointegrating relationships  among prices is not a good indicator
of the degree  to  which a market  is integrated.
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Introduction
It has  become common to  apply cointegration  techniques  to the analysis  of spatial price
relationships,  both to test the law of one price  (LOP) and to examine the degree to which
different  regions  are  mutually  integrated.  Cointegration  models presuppose  that observ-
able  variables  exhibiting nonstationary  behavior  will nonetheless  maintain long-run  re-
lationships.  These long-run relationships  are conceptually  interpreted as  stochastic (long-
run)  economic  equilibria.  In this  view  an economy  is  described  as  a multivariable  dy-
namic  system,  equilibria as  the attractors  of the  system (the set of points  towards which
the  system  tends  to  move),  and  error-correction  mechanisms  as  the  forces  that  move
prices toward the  attractor.
Among  the  most common  examples  of an error-correcting  mechanism  is arbitrage  in
a spatial market;  this is the example  that Engle  and Granger  use in their introduction to
a volume  of readings  on cointegration.  The essence of the argument  is  that prices  of a
homogenous  good  from  two  different regions  should tend  to be  equal  in  the long  run.
More  specifically,  an extended  period  with no  exogenous  shocks  would  move  the two
prices  towards  equality.  The error-correction  mechanism  is the  arbitrage  process. Profit
opportunities  arise  when  the  economy  is  away  from  the  attractor  and  arbitrage  forces
prices  back towards  the attractor  defined  by the relationship p,  = P2.  This  is essentially
a statement of the LOP.
A number  of studies  have  used  this  idea  to  test the  LOP  (Ardeni;  Goodwin  1992a;
Goodwin  and  Grennes;  Michael,  Nobay,  and  Peel).1 Some  studies  simply test  for coin-
tegration;  others  contend  that  not  only  should  cointegration  be  present  but  a  specific
linear price  relationship should be stationary.  Baffes argues  that price  movements in one
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location should be matched, in the long run, with one-for-one price movements in another
location;  this  is equivalent to  the stationarity  of price  spreads.
A corollary to the above  assertion is that the absence of trade between regions  (either
direct  or indirect)  should  result  in prices  that  are  not cointegrated.  This  has  led  some
researchers  to use  cointegration  as  an indicator  for the strength of regional  connections.
For  example,  Goodwin  (1992b)  and  Goodwin  and  Grennes  suggest that  a  system of n
spatial  prices  should  have  at  least  one  cointegrating  relationship,  and  the  number  of
cointegrating  relationships  among  prices  can  indicate  the  extent  of market  integration.
Thus,  full  market  integration requires  n  - 1 cointegrating  vectors  and  any  number  of
cointegrating  vectors  less  than n  - 1 implies  markets  which  are  not  fully  integrated.
Similar  suggestions  are  made  in Benson  et  al.  (1994a)  and  Silvapulle  and  Jayasuriya.
Also,  some  studies  perform  bivariate  tests on price  pairs,  associating  the  degree  of in-
tegration  for a given location with the number of other locations exhibiting  cointegration
(Alexander  and White).
The purpose  of this  study is to suggest caution  in the application  and interpretation of
cointegration models in analyzing spatial price behavior.  To demonstrate that such caution
is  warranted,  we  develop  an  equilibrium  spatial  market  model that  is  used to  simulate
prices.  The  simulations  allow  us  to  explore  the  hypothesis  that  cointegration  in prices
should  occur  because  the  forces  of market  integration  and  efficiency  tend  to  result  in
linearly  related prices.
Unlike  many  studies,  we  sharply  distinguish  between  the  concepts  of efficiency  and
integration.  In  our  treatment,  the  concepts  of efficiency  and  the  LOP  are  synonymous
and taken to mean  that arbitrage  opportunities  are quickly eliminated  and therefore  neg-
ligible in observed  variables,  including  prices.  This  feature is a necessary  condition for
market  equilibrium  and,  therefore,  is  a distinguishing  feature of price  behavior.  Market
integration,  on the  other  hand,  we  define  as  the  extent  to  which  shocks  arising  in  one
location  are passed on to other  locations,  a meaning  that is  consistent with  the work of
Harriss and Ravallion.  The specific definition (stated in a later section) will arise naturally
out of the equilibrium  model used here.
The analysis  indicates  that neither  efficiency  nor market integration necessarily  leads
to  linearly  related  prices.  Our  demonstration  centers  around  the  arbitrage  mechanism,
which  is shown to be  an insufficient  force to  ensure a simple linear relationship  among
spatial  prices.  There  are two  parts  to this  demonstration.  First  we  show  that if the un-
derlying  forces  affecting  supply  and  demand  in different  regions  are not  cointegrated,
arbitrage alone will not guarantee that prices exhibit cointegration, especially  as transport
rates increase  in  size and  volatility.  Second,  if the demand  and  supply forces  are  them-
selves  cointegrated  across regions,  an analyst  may conclude  that prices  are  cointegrated
regardless  of whether there are interregional flows of commodities and associated binding
arbitrage  conditions.  Examples  of cointegrated  economic  shocks  include  weather  vari-
ability in agricultural production,  public policies that have similar impacts  across regions,
or income and inflation factors.  In these instances,  the presence of cointegration  does not
indicate that arbitrage  is the source of the error correction mechanism. It therefore follows
that the  degree of cointegration  among prices  is not a useful  measure of the  strength of
the interregional  market integration.
The  suggestion  that  statistical  measures  do  not  always  have  simple  economic  inter-
pretations  is  not new.  Harriss  and  Ravallion  argue  that  high  price  correlations  do  not
necessarily indicate a high degree of market integration.  Transaction costs are also known
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to influence  cointegration  tests.  For  example,  Davutyan  and Pippenger  show that  one is
less likely  to  find cointegrated  prices or stationary  price  spreads  when  transaction costs
are large. Goodwin  (1992a)  suggests that the lack of cointegration for international wheat
prices  may  be due  to  nonstationarity  in  ocean  freight rates;  Hsu  and  Goodwin  provide
further  evidence  on  this  point.  Indeed,  Granger  also  suggests  that  nonstationary  risk
premia  may explain  the  lack of cointegrated treasury  bond prices in the  early  1980s.
In  spite of these cautions,  the number  of studies  that pay  no attention  to the problem
greatly outweigh those that even mention it. Furthermore, the issue has not been explored
systematically  within  the context  of an  economic  model  of spatial price  determination.
A novel feature of the current article  is that an explicit  spatial equilibrium  model is used
to generate  simulated  prices with known  economic  properties.  This represents  a kind  of
controlled  experiment  that  allows  us  to  explore  whether  the  interpretations  placed  on
cointegration  tests  are justified.
To  focus  attention  on the potential  problems in  applying  cointegration to  the analysis
of spatial  prices, we  first discuss spatial  models  of price behavior and their implications
for cointegration.  Later  we  discuss  a very  simple  spatial  equilibrium  model  and  an as-
sociated  measure  of market  integration  are  developed.  The  model  is  used  to  generate
simulated  price  data to illustrate  some of the problems  discussed  above.
Spatial Equilibrium Models  and Price  Spreads
A number of spatial equilibrium models currently  exist,  although many (if not most) can
be  classified  into  two  groups.  The  first,  originating  with  Hotelling  and  Smithies,  is  a
network  framework  with  markets  or firms  located  at  network  nodes  and  consumers  or
commodity  producers  located  continuously  along  network  links.  Agents  located  along
the links will choose  to transact  at the node offering  the best price  net of transport costs.
Such models,  which we call  agents-on-links  models,  are often,  although  not exclusively,
used  to  model  spatial  oligopoly  situations  where  firms  exert  some  local  monopoly  or
monopsony  power  but may  gain  or  lose  market  share  to  firms  located  at other  nodes.
Benson  et al. (1994a,b)  study  the cointegration  of spatial  prices in  the context of such  a
model,  but provide  no formal  link between  the  model  and  cointegration  methods.  The
application of cointegration  methods  in the analysis of market power has been criticized
by Werden  and  Froeb.
The  second  group  of models  is  also  based  on  a network  structure  but  the  network
links  serve only  for commodity  transportation  flows.  Such point-location  models  origi-
nated  with  Enke  and  Samuelson  and  were  popularized  by Takayama  and  Judge.  They
have mainly been  used to model perfectly  competitive  markets  characterized by distinct
regions  or centers  of activity.
Which  of these  two  classes  of models  is  appropriate  depends  on  the  nature  of  the
market.  For  example,  agricultural  products  are  often  produced  in  rural  areas  around
isolated processing  plants.  The plants have  local  monopsony  power,  but are  constrained
by the possibility  that producers  can ship to competitors'  plants.  In a  study of the prices
paid to  producers  at the  plant,  the  first  model  would  therefore  be  appropriate.  On  the
other hand, many bulk goods are  collected or processed  at  a small number of points and
then transported to a small number of major distribution centers; grain, coal, and gasoline
markets  are  examples.  In  such  cases,  as  well  as  in  many international  trade  situations,
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especially  those involving  ocean  freight or  tariffs  imposed at the  border,  point-location
models are  appropriate.
The issue of whether  a perfect  competition  assumption  is appropriate  is conceptually
different from that  of the  choice  of a spatial structure.  An  agents-on-links  model with a
competitive  assumption  might  be  appropriate  in  a  situation  in  which  several  firms  are
located at each of the major distribution  centers.
In the point-location  model  each pair of nodes  is either  linked  by trade  or it isn't. If
the nodes are  linked by trade  (either directly  or indirectly)  then prices  will differ by an
amount  that  depends  only  on  transport  rates.  To  illustrate,  suppose  region  1 ships  to
region  2,  so there  is  a  direct  trade  link.  The  appropriate  arbitrage  condition  is P2 - pA
= r1 2, where Pi is the price  in region  i and rij  is the cost of shipping  from region  i to j.
The regions  may  also  be indirectly  linked.  For example,  suppose regions  1 and  2 both
ship to  3;  prices must  satisfy P2 = p3 - r 2 3 and p,  = p3 - r13, implying that P2 - P 1 =
r13  - r23. An  immediate  implication  for  dynamic  price  behavior  is  that  price  spread
stationarity  requires transport rate stationarity.2 This is an empirical question,  and indeed,
there  is  some  evidence  to  suggest  that ocean  freight  rates,  at  least,  behave  like  many
other prices  in  exhibiting  nonstationarity  (Hsu and  Goodwin).3
With an agents-on-links  model the relationship  between the nodal prices is even more
complicated.  Between  each  node  a  boundary  exists  at  which  an  agent  is  indifferent
between  transacting  with one  node or the  other.  Thus, the  prices  at  the nodes  will gen-
erally not differ by the cost of transporting  the goods between them, and hence,  arbitrage
between the two  nodal points  cannot be the mechanism  generating  cointegrated  prices.
If there is a role for arbitrage  as  an error correcting  mechanism in the agents-on-links
model,  it  must be  the  arbitrage  that  occurs in determining  the  boundary.  For example,
suppose  that regions  1 and  2 are d miles apart  and there is a  constant per mile transport
cost,  r, between  them. The indifference  boundary,  B,  measured  in miles  from region  1,
satisfies  the arbitrage condition p1 - rB = P2 - r(d - B); equilibrium prices  are therefore
related  according to
(1)  P2 - P  =  r(d - 2B).
In this  case the stationarity  of the price  differentials  depends on the stationarity not only
of the  transport  rates  but  also  of  the  market  boundary  times  the  transport  rate.  The
location of the boundary will shift over time as demand,  supply,  and transportation costs
change;  thus it is determined  in a complex  way by all  the relevant factors  affecting the
market. As these are the same factors causing the apparent price nonstationarity, arbitrage
alone cannot  account for price  spread stationarity.4
2  More precisely,  for  all price  spreads  to  be stationary,  all transport  rates must  be  stationary.  It  is  possible,  however,  for
some  spreads  to  be stationary  and  not  others.  For example,  suppose  that r13  and r2 3 are nonstationary  but  that r 3 - r2 3 is
stationary.  Consider  a market in which  locations  1 and  2 consistently  ship to location  3, so  = p  =  3  - r3 and P2 = P3 - r 23.
This implies  that P2 - Pl  is stationary  but P2 - p 3 and Pl  - p 3 are  not.
3  If transport rate  data were  available,  cointegration  among  the prices and the transport rates could  be analyzed.  Such data
are  generally  difficult to obtain and even when transport rates are  available,  other important  transaction costs that affect price
relationships  may not be.
4  The  theoretical  differences  between  the  two  spatial  models  may be  less  than  is  commonly  supposed.  Agents-on-links
models  differ from  point-location  models by  allowing  marginal adjustments  at  the indifference  boundary.  In point-location
models,  shipping  patterns  represent  discrete  regimes  and  thus  such  marginal  adjustments  cannot  occur.  As  the number  of
nodes  increases,  however,  a point-location model can mimic  the continuous  behavior of an agents-on-links  model.  Although
this  is  impractical  for  empirical  modeling,  it suggests  that problems  encountered  with  one model  class may be encountered
in  the other. If a problem arises  in the use of a point-location  model that does  not depend  on the number of nodes, it is  likely
that  this problem  will  also exist in  the limiting  agents-on-links  type model  as  n->o.  Thus,  the differences  in  behavior  often
attributed  to  these  alternative  model  formulations  may,  in  fact,  have more  to  do  with  the competitive  structure  rather  than
the  spatial  structure of the models.
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At a  minimum, cointegrated  prices  and stationary  price spreads  depend on the station-
arity of transport  rates,  as  noted in previous  studies. Problems with cointegration analysis
may still exist, however,  even when transport rates are stationary.  To show this, we develop
a fairly  simple  model of spatial  price  determination  and use  it to  demonstrate  how  such
problems  can  arise.  Given  that  stationary  price  spreads  appear  more  likely  in  a  point-
location  than an  agents-on-links  model, we use  the former to make that demonstration.
An Explicit Point-Location  Model
In  this  section  an  explicit  point-location  spatial  equilibrium  model  is  discussed.  The
model  depicts  the simplest  of spatial  settings  with endogenously  determined  prices  and
shipment  quantities.  There are n regions,  each  with a linear excess demand function that
depends  on the  price  in  the  given  region,  along  with  a  set of transport  rates  between
each region.  The excess  demand for a homogeneous  commodity in location i we param-
eterize  as:
(2)  i = bi(ai-Pi),
where  q,  is  the  quantity  and  pi  is  the  price.  The  terms  ai  and  bi  are  strictly  positive
parameters;  ai is referred  to  as  the  autarky price  for location i and  represents  the price
at  which  location  i neither  imports  nor exports.  When  qi  > 0  (<0), location  i is  a net
receiving (shipping)  location. Let ri  - 0 represent the cost of transporting  the commodity
from location  i to location j; transport  services  have perfectly  elastic  supply. 5
The nonnegative amount  shipped  from location i to j  is denoted  si,  with
(3)  qi =  E  (Sji  - si).
Necessary  and  sufficient conditions  for equilibrium  in  this model  are  as  follows:
(4)  i  (sji - sij)  = 0,
i  i  j
and
(5)  Pj,  - i - ri  0  ,  (pj  - pi - rij)ij = 0  Vi, j.
The first of these represents  the material balances  identity that the sum of imports equals
the  sum of exports.  The  second  expression  is  a  set of complementarity  conditions  rep-
resenting  the absence of arbitrage opportunities,  namely,  the LOP.
As Samuelson first pointed out, this model can be formulated  and solved as a quadratic
programming  problem.  With  a  small  number  of locations  the  solution  can be  directly
expressed  in terms of the model parameters.  For example,  with two locations,  there will
be trade  if one of the autarky prices,  say  a2, exceeds  a,  by at least  r12, in  which case
(6)  P  =  (ba, + b2a2 - b2r,2)
b,  + b2
5  Although the  spatial metaphor is used here and  the rj  are  referred to as  transport rates, other  interpretations  of the model
are possible.  For example,  it could be taken to be a model of currencies  denominated in a numeraire currency, with transaction
costs incurred  in exchange.  In general,  this model can represent  a market for any  good that is transformed into another good
at  a rate that does  not depend  on  the amount  transformed.
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Figure 1.  Price responses  to changes  in the transport rate from location  1  to 2
and P2 exceeds pI by r,2. If there is no trade, of course,  each price will equal its respective
autarky  price  level.  In  this  simple  two-region  model  there  are  three  different  possible
shipping patterns:  1 to  2,  2 to  1,  and  autarky.
Considering only two locations,  however,  does not provide much richness  in terms of
interregional  price behavior.  The  simulations performed  later  in this article  make  use of
a  three-location  case,  which  allows  regions  to  be  connected  by  trade  indirectly.  For
example,  locations  1 and  3 may both ship to  location 2,  implying prices  at 1 and 3  must
differ by exactly  the  difference  in the relevant  transport  rates  (p3 - p  r12  - r 32).  In
the three-location case there are  19 different shipment. patterns.  Details of the equilibrium
solutions  are given in  an appendix.6
The nonlinear nature of price response to shocks  is illustrated in figures  1 and 2. 7 Both
figures demonstrate  how the prices in the three locations change in response to a change
6 Three  is  the largest number  of locations  for  which it  is practical  to  derive  the equilibrium  conditions  explicitly  because
the number  of possible  patterns  grows  very  fast as  more  locations are  added.  For  example,  with four  locations  the number
of possible  shipping patterns  is  189!
7 Both figures  use the following  base  case  parameters:
a  = [95  100  105]'
b  = [1/3  1/3  1/3]T
and
0  4  5
R=6  0  3  .
5  7  0
1  2o3  !1  12 1-)3
























II  1  1
IMarket Equilibrium and Cointegration  197







85  90  95  100  105  110  115  120
al
Figure 2.  Price responses  to excess  demand shifts  in location  1
in  a  single  parameter.  As  the  parameters  change,  the  market  moves  through  various
shipping patterns,  which are noted at the top of the figures  and are delineated by dashed
lines.
Figure  1 demonstrates  the response of prices to changes  in a  single transport  rate, rl2,
the  rate for shipping  from location  1 to location  2.  When this  rate  is very  low,  it pays
for  location  1 to  ship  directly  to  location  2,  which  transships  on to  location  3.  In  this
case,  an increase  in  r12 causes  location  l's price  to  decline  and  the  prices in  the  other
locations  to increase  (both at the  same rate).  For 2  <  r 2 < 2.5,  however,  it is better to
ship directly  from  1 to  3, rather  than to  transship through  2 (the direct  cost from  1 to 3
is  5  whereas  the transshipment  cost  is 3  +  r1 2).  Notice  that,  in  this  interval,  the prices
in locations  1 and 3  are linked one-for-one,  both dropping  as more shipments are diverted
away  from the  increasingly  costly  1 to  2  route.  For  r 12 > 2.5  it is  no longer profitable
for location  1 to  ship  to  location  2;  further  increases  in  r12 have  no impact  on  prices
because  the route is  not used.
Figure 2 displays  the response  of prices  to excess demand  shifts in location  1. When
a, is  low  (less  than  92),  location  1 is  a net  surplus  region  and  it  supplies  both  of the
other locations.  Notice that the  slopes  of the price response  functions  are equal,  so the
prices move in a one-for-one  fashion. As the autarky price in location  1 increases (greater
local demand  or  less local  supply)  it ceases  to  supply  location 2.  Thus  for 92  < a,  <
96,  the  price  in  location  2  is  not responsive  to  excess  demand  changes  in  location  1.
Further  increases  in al, however,  stimulate location  2 to become  a  supplier  for location
3,  and  the three  prices  become  mutually  linked  again.  For  99  <  a 1 <  107,  region  1 is
no longer  a net  supplier and  its price  becomes  delinked from those of the other regions.
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For  al in  this  interval,  the  price  in location  1 rises  quickly  and  goes  higher than  the
prices in the other locations. When it rises high enough, it becomes profitable for location
2 and, eventually,  location  3 to supply  location  1.
In addition  to  demonstrating  the  highly nonlinear nature  of the response  of prices  to
the underlying  parameter  values, these  figures  demonstrate  several points  that have  im-
portant  implications  for empirical  analysis  of price  comovements.  First,  transport rate
changes  can cause prices  to move inversely  to one another,  even when  shipping patterns
don't change.  The second,  and  more important,  point concerns relative  price responses
to changes  in excess demand.  When the markets are all linked by trade,  all of the prices
rise at the  same  rate in response to  an increase  in excess  demand.  When a region is not
linked by trade, however,  there is no price response in that region to an increase in excess
demand  in  another  region.  Although  this  feature  is  specific  to  this  simple  model,  it
suggests  that trade  linkages are related to the transmission of shocks from one region to
another.
As we have noted, there is no standard definition of market integration in the literature.
Many  studies use  the term  as  a  measure of market  connectedness,  but others  take inte-
gration  and market  efficiency  to be identical  concepts.  As we  already use  the term effi-
ciency  to mean  the lack  of arbitrage  opportunities,  we will  use  the term  integration to
refer  to  the  connectedness  of the  markets.  More  specifically,  we  would like  to  have  a
measure of how  large  an impact  one region has on another.
We propose,  therefore,  a definition  of market integration between  two regions  as  the
degree  to  which a shock  arising in  one location is  transmitted  to the other.  Specifically,
excess  demand  shocks  originating  in  one region will have  price  effects  in that location
and, to the extent that the region is integrated,  will have price  effects in other locations.
A  scaleless  measure  of the  interregional  effects  of the  price effect  in  the  other  region
relative  to  the price effect in  the region originating  the change  is the price transmission
ratio,  defined  as
(12)  PTR,  =  (opjlaa)l(Plaai).
8
In this  simple  model,  if two regions  are  linked  by trade,  either  directly  or indirectly,  a
small excess demand  shock will have the same price impact in both regions, so the price
transmission  ratio  is  1 (this  is  evident in  appendix  table  Al). Prices  must  exhibit  this
relationship  to  maintain the equality  of the price  spreads to  the relevant transport  rates.
On the other hand, if the two markets are not connected  by trade, there is no mechanism
for the transmission  of shocks and  the price  transmission  ratio will equal 0.
The  price  transmission  ratio  must  equal  0  or  1 for  infinitesimal  changes,  but  for
discrete  shifts  in excess  demand  (ApjlAai)l(Apl/Aaj)  can  lie anywhere  on the  [0,1]  in-
terval. This  can occur when the change  in the autarky  price,  a,, causes  a change in the
shipping  pattern,  as  was illustrated  in figure  2.  To  measure  the  connectedness  of two
regions  the  expected price  transmission  ratio  can  be  used. Market  integration,  therefore,
is defined  as
8 For  simplicity,  we  focus only  on shocks  causing parallel  shifts in excess  demand which is equivalent to  a change in the
autarky  price. Equivalent results  would be obtained if the price transmission  ratio were  defined in terms of changes in excess
demand  slopes.
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(13)  I,  = E[PTRj] =  E[(dp, 1/ai)/(pi/odai)]. 9
Whether  regions  are linked  by trade  in  any  time period  depends  on  the relationship
between  the  autarky  prices  (ai) and  transport  rates  (rij).  Statistical  relationships  among
prices and  the  degree  of market  integration  depend,  therefore,  on  the  stochastic  nature
of these parameters.  Furthermore, the nature of this dependence is extremely complicated,
even  for  a three-location  market,  due  to  the  nonlinearities  inherent  in  the  equilibrium
conditions.  To  study  the behavior  of prices  and the  relationship  between  statistical  and
economic  measures,  we  therefore turn  to simulation.
Simulated Prices  and Tests  for Cointegration
The  economic  model  of the  previous  section  is static.  Intertemporal price  variation can
be introduced through stochastic  transport rates and  shifts in excess demand.  We confine
attention to parallel  shifts in excess demand,  which are equivalent to  stochastic variation
in  the  autarky  prices.  Furthermore,  for  cointegration  tests  to be  interesting,  we require
that prices be  nonstationary  and transport  rates  be stationary.  The latter we  assume  and
the  former we  achieve  by assuming  that autarky  prices  are nonstationary.
Market  clearing  is  assumed to  occur in  every period  and the market  is efficient  with
prices  exhibiting  no arbitrage  opportunities  in  equilibrium.  This  is a  strong  assumption
and  is  more  likely  to  hold  for low  rather  than high  frequency  data.  In  actual  markets,
prices may not adjust instantaneously due to various information and scheduling frictions.
Our point here,  however,  is not to model possible ways in which  inefficiencies can arise
but rather to demonstrate  that,  even in well-operating  markets,  the interpretation  of coin-
tegration  tests  is problematic.  It  is unlikely  that  the  introduction  of  short-run  frictions
will make  such  tests more interpretable.  Furthermore,  we are trying to  demonstrate  that
arbitrage  is not a  sufficiently  strong  error correcting  mechanism  to ensure  cointegration
of spatial prices.  As such,  we  want to explore price behavior when  arbitrage is working
perfectly; otherwise a lack of cointegration might be attributed to a failure of the arbitrage
process.
Having  an explicit  model of spatial prices permits  exploration of the relationship  be-
tween  economic  concepts  such  as  efficiency  (no  arbitrage  opportunities)  or market  in-
tegration  and  statistical  tests  like  cointegration.  By  simulating  prices  derived  from  an
economic  model,  the  cointegration  properties  of prices  can  be  explored  in  a  known
economic  setting.
The simulations  are structured to bring out two points. First,  stochastic transport rates
can cause market integration  to be less  than perfect,  resulting  in cointegration  tests that
fail  to  reject  unit  root price  behavior  even  when  the  LOP holds  instantaneously.  This
problem becomes  worse  as  transport rates  become more  volatile and increase  in propor-
tion to the  value  of the delivered  good.  Second,  even  in  situations  where price  spreads
are stationary,  cointegration  tests  can fail to  be informative  about the degree  of market
integration.
9In  our simple  model Ii has another  interpretation.  The price  transmission  ratio is either 0  if two regions  are  not linked
by  trade  or  1 if there  is  a  trade linkage.  In  expected  value,  the price  transmission  ratio is  therefore  equal  to  the expected
frequency  that  a trade linkage exists.
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Simulation Design
The basic  structure  for the economic  fundamentals  is
(7)  at = jI +  Cat_,  +  et  (autarky  prices),
(8)  et  ~  N(0, fl)  (autarky  price  shocks),
(9)  rt  N(O, 2)  (transport rates),
(10)  E[etrt]  =  0,  and
(11)  b,  =  b,  =  b  = 1/3  (excess  demand slopes),
where  at is a three-vector  of autarky prices for period t,  rt is the vector of transport rates
for  period  t,  and  each  slope,  bi, is  constant  for  all periods.  In  all  the  simulations  it is
assumed, for simplicity, that transport rates are symmetric (r0 i  =  rj,); r therefore is defined
as  the three-vector:  r  = (r1 2 r 23 r13)'.  Also, for simplicity, the slopes of demand functions
(the bi) are  equal  (11),  and the  autarky price  shocks and  transport rates  are independent
(10).
The simulations  are not designed to mimic the far richer time-series properties of actual
commodity  prices  or  transport  rates.  Although  possible  to  include  higher  order  lags,
seasonal or drift terms,  such complications  would include extraneous elements not related
to  the basic  issues  addressed.  Instead  we  have  tried to  make  the  simulations  as  simple
as  possible  in order to  simplify the interpretation  of the results.
Two  sets of simulations  are performed  that differ mainly in the stationarity properties
of the demand  shocks.  Simulation parameter  values  are  given in  figure  3. In  simulation
1 the demand  shocks  are  independent  unit-root processes.  This represents  a  situation in
which  prices  wander  freely  in  the  absence  of trade,  but  when  trade  occurs,  prices  are
tied together  by the  arbitrage boundaries.  Simulation  1, therefore,  represents  a situation
in which the only  candidate  error correction  mechanism  is the arbitrage process.  In this
way  the  strength  of the  arbitrage  process  and  the  effect  of transport  rates  on it can  be
isolated and  examined.
Three different  transport rate  scenarios  are used in  this simulation:  cases  1A,  1B,  and
1C,  representing low, medium,  and high transport rate situations,  respectively. The trans-
port rate levels were chosen to represent approximately  2,  6, and  10%  of the initial price
of the commodity;  such  rates  are not unusual for bulk commodities.  With low transport
rates, the regions  are more likely  to be fully integrated  than in the case of high transport
rates.  Low transport rates result in more periods of binding arbitrage and hence a greater
probability  that  price  spreads  appear  stationary.  As  transport  rates  go  to  zero,  price
spreads  would  also be  zero  and,  trivially,  the  nonlinearities  in  price behavior would  be
eliminated.  On  the  other  hand,  as  transport  rates  increase  in  mean  size,  the  degree  of
market  integration  declines  as  regions  are  more  often  isolated  from  one  another.  This
leads  to more  time  spent  within the  arbitrage  bands  and  therefore  with prices delinked
and  free to  exhibit nonstationary  behavior.
In  simulation  2,  the  autarky  prices  are nonstationary  but  are  cointegrated  in  such  a
way  that  the  autarky  price  spreads  are  stationary.  This  implies  that  price  spreads  will
also be stationary,  although they will not necessarily  be representable  by a  simple linear
time-series model.  An important implication of price spread stationarity is that the system
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General Form:
a, =  ti + Ca,_,  + E,
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Figure 3.  Parameter values  for simulations
has a  tendency  to return to the specific  trading pattern associated  with the mean  autarky
price spread. In this simulation  three different cases, denoted  2A-2C, are examined. The
stationary  point for the  three  simulations  was  chosen  so  the degree  of trade  among  the
locations  varied  while  maintaining  an  average  price  of  100  at  the  stationary  point. 1 0
Specifically,  simulations  2A,  2B,  and  2C  represent  low,  medium,  and  high  degrees  of
market integration,  respectively.
Both  sets of simulations  use the  following  procedure.  First,  200 time-series  observa-
tions  for a, and  r, are  drawn (typical  sample  sizes  in  the  studies  surveyed  ranged  from
140 to  180).  Second,  using these 200 realizations,  the equilibrium  shipping  patterns  and
the  associated  prices for  each period are  computed.  Third,  using  the  shipping  patterns,
sample  measures  of market  integration  are  computed.  The  sample  market  integration
indices,  Iij,  are computed  as the frequency that locations i and j  are linked by trade. Also
10  In simulation  2, initial  values  of the ai were chosen  to coincide  with  the long-run  average ai.
105.5
aoc =  85.5
L109  1
4.0
uc =  -10.5
6.5
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calculated  is a joint integration index, I123,  defined  as  the frequency with which  all three
locations  are  linked by trade.  Fourth,  using the  sample  spatial prices,  price level  corre-
lations,  cointegration  tests  on price  levels,  and  unit-root  tests  on price  spreads  are  cal-
culated.  These  steps  are  replicated  6,000 times  (to coincide  with  calculations  made  by
Johansen  and  Juselius  for  the  limiting  distribution  of cointegration  test  statistics)  and
average results  are computed  and reported.
The  cointegration  methods  follow  the work  of'Johansen  and  Juselius.  Prices  are  as-
sumed to  be autoregressive  of order one  with no  seasonality  or drift terms.  This  speci-
fication coincides  with autarky price  behavior.  The maximum eigenvalue  test is used for
inferences  about the  cointegrating  rank of spatial prices based  on a  95%  critical value.
The critical values differ slightly from those in Johansen  and Juselius  appendix table A2
because  the  sample  size  used  here  is  200  as  opposed  to  400  observations  as  used  by
Johansen  and Juselius. 1 l
To test for stationary price  spreads, autoregressive  models of order one were  estimated
for  spatial  price  spreads.  This  analysis  also  assumes  no  seasonality  or  drift terms;  the
procedures  and  limiting  distribution  of the  t-statistic  used here  can  be  found  in  Fuller
(chapter  8).  The price  spread  stationarity  tests  provide  evidence  on  whether prices  not
only  exhibit  cointegration,  but more  specifically,  on whether  the  cointegrating  relation-
ships  imply one-for-one  price movements  in  the long run.
Results
The  mean  and  standard  deviation  of the  market  integration  indices  and  simple  price
correlations  over the 6,000 replications  arreported in table 1. For simulation  1 transport
rates increase from simulation  1A to  1C. The higher transport rates lead to more instances
of market isolation (less market integration)  and,  because of independent excess demand
shocks,  lower price  correlations.  Simulation  2,  on the other hand,  demonstrates  that low
levels  of integration,  as  in case  2A,  do not necessarily  imply  low price  correlations. 1 2
Test  results  for  the  number  of  cointegrating  relationships  and  for  stationary  price
spreads  are  given in table  2. A test rejection using  Ai leads to the conclusion  that at least
i  +  1 cointegrating  relationships  are  present.  A test rejection using  Tij  leads to  the con-
clusion  that the price  spread pj  - pi is  stationary.
In  simulation  1, the probability  of finding  at  least  a  single  cointegrating  relationship
(reject  Ao)  declines  as  the transport  rate increases  (from  93.3%  to 27.9%).  Furthermore,
the  frequency  that two  cointegrating  relationships  are  found  (reject A1)  occurs  less than
50% of the time, even in the low transport rate case.  Similarly, the frequency with which
price  spreads  are  found  to  be  stationary  declines  dramatically  as  mean  transport  rates
increase  (from 76%-87%  with  low rates to  20%-35%  at  high rates).1 3
Two  points  are  in  order relative  to these  findings.  First, the tests fail  to find evidence
of the  LOP,  interpreted  as  prices  exhibiting  no  arbitrage  opportunities.  The  simulated
prices  are  equilibrium  prices  at which  all  arbitrage  opportunities  have been  eliminated
I Critical  values  for  samples  of  size  200  were  computed  by  the  authors  using  the methods  described  in  Johansen  and
Juselius  (p.  207).
12 This  is  similar to  the  problem  discussed  by  Harriss  of  interpreting  price correlations  when  excess  demand  shocks  are
correlated.
13  The  asymmetry  in  these  results  arises  from  the  initial  conditions  for these  simulations  which  make  it more  likely that
either locations  1 or 3 would become  isolated.
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Table  1.  Market Integration Indices and Price Correlations
Simulation  1  Simulation  2
A  B  C  A  B  C
Market integration indices
I12  0.901  0.714  0.561  0.580  0.820  0.934
(0.063)  (0.155)  (0.212)  (0.041)  (0.032)  (0.019)
123  0.901  0.713  0.559  0.673  0.967  0.999
(0.064)  (0.158)  (0.212)  (0.039)  (0.013)  (0.001)
I13  0.916  0.754  0.609  0.367  0.788  0.934
(0.065)  (0.164)  (0.228)  (0.038)  (0.033)  (0.019)
I123  0.862  0.618  0.440  0.367  0.788  0.934
(0.076)  (0.167)  (0.202)  (0.038)  (0.033)  (0.019)
Price correlations
P12  0.961  0.787  0.604  0.961  0.982  0.988
(0.043)  (0.209)  (0.331)  (0.030)  (0.014)  (0.009)
P23  0.960  0.785  0.601  0.970  0.990  0.990
(0.044)  (0.211)  (0.331)  (0.024)  (0.008)  (0.008)
P13  0.961  0.785  0.615  0.944  0.985  0.993
(0.045)  (0.232)  (0.354)  (0.043)  (0.012)  (0.006)
Note:  This  table  displays  the  average  values  of  6,000  replications  of  the  sample  market  integration
indices  and price correlations  (standard  deviations are  given in parentheses).  Ii measures  the  fraction of
the observations  in which locations  i and j are  linked by trade.  I123  measures  the  fraction  of the  obser-
vations in which all three locations  are  linked by trade.
Table 2.  Proportion of Test Rejections
rTest  Simulation  1  Simulation 2
Statistica  A  B  C  A  B  C
Number of cointegrating relationships
A2  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.6  0.5  0.5
A 1 42.3  5.1  1.0  97.2  97.9  99.1
Ao  93.3  47.7  27.9  100.0  100.0  100.0
Stationarity of price spreads
7 12 86.5  40.3  20.0  99.8  99.8  100.0
T23  86.7  40.8  20.0  99.8  99.9  100.0
r 1 3 76.4  42.1  34.6  99.9  99.7  100.0
a The cointegration  tests,  Ak,  are Johansen  and  Juselius  maximum ei-
genvalue  tests.  The null hypothesis associated  with the test is that the
system of three  price  levels  has  k  cointegrating  vectors  with corre-
sponding alternative  hypothesis of k  +  1 cointegrating relationships.
All test  statistics  are  evaluated  at the 95%  confidence  level.  The sta-
tionarity  tests  ri are  Dickey-Fuller  tests that the price  spread is pj -
pi is  nonstationary  (unit-root) process.
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and  the  LOP  holds  by  construction.  Therefore,  a  perfectly  arbitraged  market  may  not
exhibit  price  spread  stationarity,  and indeed,  it need not  exhibit any  cointegrating  rela-
tionships, much less n - 1 of them. Thus, the finding that price spreads  are not stationary
or that  prices fail  to exhibit  cointegration  is  a poor  indication  of whether the market  is
operating  efficiently.
A second  point relates the  cointegration  and stationarity  tests to the degree  of market
integration.  As market integration  declines,  there  is a corresponding  decline in both  the
number of cointegrating  relationships  detected and  in the frequency  of price  spread  sta-
tionarity.  It would be tempting, therefore, to conclude that these tests provide reasonable
indications  of the  degree  of market  integration.  Simulation  2  will  show,  however,  that
such  an interpretation  is problematic.
In  each  case  for  simulation  2,  table  2  indicates  that  the  cointegration  tests  and price
spread  stationarity  tests  yield  virtually  the  same  results.  Based  on these tests  one  would
conclude that there are two cointegrating  relationships, that all price spreads are stationary,
and  that the  markets  are  fully integrated.  Recall  from table  1, however,  that  these three
cases differ dramatically in their degrees of market integration. Thus, the stationarity prop-
erties of prices reveal little about the degree to which markets  are actually linked by trade.
Market integration  and price cointegration,  therefore,  are  quite different  concepts.
There  is an important  economic  distinction between  simulation  1 and 2.  In  simulation
1, prices  are  free  to  wander  in  the  absence  of trade.  This  implies  that  barriers  to  trade,
such  as  high transport rates  or border  controls,  lead to prices  that  exhibit  no discernible
relationship.  Cointegration,  in this  case,  can only  be due to the presence  of binding  equi-
librium arbitrage restrictions and,  therefore,  from some degree of market integration.  Sim-
ulation  2,  by comparison,  exhibits  price  relationships  even  in  the  absence  of trade,  and
cointegration  tests  are  incapable  of distinguishing the degree  to which these relationships
are  due to market integration  rather than to economic  shocks  with common sources.
The  problems  this  raises  for  the  applied  researcher  is  that  situations  with  distinct
economic  meanings  produce similar time-series  test results. Without  further information
about the  true  time-series  structure  of the  economic  fundamentals  or  adequate  data  on
trade  flows or transport rates, the analyst is unable  to distinguish these two diametrically
different  economic  environments.  Specifically,  if one  is  trying  to  assess  the  degree  of
market  connectedness,  cointegration tests  are not very informative  unless the cointegra-
tion properties  of the unobserved  autarky prices  are  known.  On the other hand, if one is
attempting to test whether prices  satisfy arbitrage conditions  (the LOP),  one would need
to know that markets  were well integrated  and that transport rates are stationary  to have
faith in  cointegration  tests.
The link between  cointegration on the one hand  and market efficiency  and integration
is  particularly  problematic  when  arbitrage  costs  are  large  and  volatile.  This  tends  to
change  the  pattern  of price  arbitrage  relationships,  leading  to  highly  nonlinear  price
behavior.  For  prices  that  exhibit  such  conditions,  linear time-series  methods  appear to
have  limited usefulness  for making inferences  about market  efficiency  and integration.
Conclusions
The familiar admonition  that  "correlation  does  not imply  causation"  can be modified  to
that of "cointegration  does not imply integration."  At best, the relationship between the
204  December 1997Market Equilibrium and Cointegration  205
economic  concepts  of the  law of  one  price  and  market  integration  and  the  statistical
concept  of cointegration  is  a  complex  one.  We have  argued  that  arbitrage  alone  is not
necessarily  a powerful enough error-correcting mechanism to produce cointegrated spatial
prices  and  have  suggested  a  number  of  situations  in  which  the  relationship  between
cointegration  and arbitrage conditions  is not consistent.  First, if transport rates  and other
costs of arbitraging between regions  are nonstationary then cointegration is unlikely, even
when regions  are engaged in trade.  Second, if autarky prices  (prices that would occur in
the  absence  of trade)  are not  cointegrated,  then the trading  patterns  among regions  are
likely  to  shift over  time  and  there  may  be periods  in  which  regions  are  not linked  by
trade  and  are  therefore  not  strongly  integrated.  This  can  result  in prices  that  are  not
cointegrated  but never violate  arbitrage  bounds. Third,  although it  may  be tempting  to
conclude that the lack of cointegation  signals a lack of market integration, this connection
does not hold if there are forces causing the autarky prices themselves  to be cointegrated.
This can cause price  spreads  to appear  to be  stationary regardless of the strength of the
trading  ties between the regions.
Although this  article  has  focused  on deficiencies  in an increasingly  common method,
it also contains  a framework that may offer more promising approaches  to spatial market
analysis.  Equilibrium simulation  methods,  as those used here, can foster our understand-
ing  and  development  of such  methods.  By  constructing  economic  equilibrium  models,
an  analyst  must lay  bare  the  assumptions  underlying the  interpretation  to  be placed  on
the  results.  Furthermore,  by  simulating  such  equilibria,  complex  nonlinearities  can  be
explored  in  a  way that  would  be  essentially  impossible  to  analyze  analytically.  In this
way,  methods  that explicitly  model  the nonlinearities or that incorporate  more  informa-
tion concerning  the  cost of arbitrage  could be explored.
[Received November 1996; final revision received June 1997.]
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Appendix:  Solving  the Three-Location Model  for Prices
The  solution  technique  to  the  three-location  spatial  equilibrium  problem  begins  with
imposing a particular shipment pattern  among the three locations. Conditional on a given
shipment  pattern,  equilibrium  prices  and  shipment  levels can  be  solved for in terms  of
the excess demand parameters  and transport rates.  Using these solutions, one can impose
the necessary  and  sufficient requirements  for prices  and  shipments  and, thereby,  derive
the necessary  and  sufficient conditions  for each equilibrium  shipping  pattern.
To  demonstrate,  consider  the  general  shipping  pattern  of location  i shipping  to both
locations j  and  k. The  equilibrium  condition  along with the two  arbitrage conditions  for
this  shipping  pattern  are
qi +  qj  +  qk  =  0,
Pj - Pi =  r,  and
Pk  - j  =  rk.
After  substituting  in  the  linear  excess  demand  functions,  these  conditions  can  be  pre-
sented more  conveniently  in matrix  notation  as
b,  bj  b,  p  P  I  aibi
- 1  j0  l  p,-
0  -1  1JPk]  r,,k
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Table Al.  Parametric Conditions  and Prices for Equilibrium Shipping Patterns
Shipment
Pattern  Pricesa Conditions
1.  Autarky  Pi =  a, pj =  aj, Pk  =  ak  aj - ai - rij - 0  iV  i  j
2.  i =  j,  k  Pi = (owa  +  wja  -o)rij)/(oi +  )j)  aj - ai - ru > 0,
pj =  (w&,a  +  Jaj +  coirj)/(()i  +  .j)  ()i(ai  - ak)  + Co(aj - a,) >  max[o%(r u
- rik)  -C)irik,  -Ojrjk-  oi(rij +  rjk)]
Pk  =  ak  ci(ai - ak)  +  oj(aj - a,) <  min[foirk
+  )j(rij + rki),  -,i(rij  - rkj)  +
3iOjrkj]
3.  i  >  j =  k  Pi = a - (Oj +  ok)r,  - )okrjk  rik - rij - rjk  >  0 pj = a  +  oirij - (o)kr k %(aj - ai) +  tk(ak  - ai) >  (Oj.  +
wk)rij  +  ()krjk
Pk  = a  + wfiri  + () i +  w.)rjk  ,)i(a k - ai) + cj(a k - aj)  >  (() i +
C)j)  rk  +  )irij
4.  i =--  j, i  =  k  Pi = a - ()ru - wkrik  rik  + rkj  -ri  > 0,  rij  + rjk  rik  > 0
pj  = a + () i +  )k)rij - (,tkrik  w(ak  - ai) + wj(a k - aj) >  (oo i +
t)j)rik-  Co)jij
Pk  =  a  - ojri  + (wi  + %.)rk  w(i(aj  - ai) + wk(aj  - ak)  >  (wi  +
ok)ri j - Okrik
5.  i  k, j  k  Pi = a-  (oj  + wok)r  +  okrkj  rjk  + ri  - ri  >  , r,k  + r,,  - r  > O
pj  = a +  oirij + Okrkj  o)i(ai - aj) + wk(ak  - aj) >  (o)i +
(0k)  rk - )irik
Pk  =  a  + oirij - () i , + o()j)r  k(aj  - ai) +  k(ak - a,)  >  (i)j  +
(o)k)rik-  L)jrjk
a a = 1wa)  and  j  = bjl(bi).






(  I  f)
- a)o,  (i)  a
( o
k  r ij  ,
oc)i  +  --  rkj
where  oi  =  bil(2bj). Using  these  solutions  in the  original  system  of  excess  demand
functions,  one  can  solve  for  the  quantity  of  shipments  in  equilibrium.  The  shipment
solutions for this  example have  the form:
=  - 1  1 [;s  |  [i1  0  l]diag(B)(p-a),
where diag(B) is  a diagonal matrix  with the  slope coefficients  along the diagonal.  Using
the equilibrium price  and  shipment solutions,  the necessary and  sufficient conditions  are
imposed and used to derive  the parametric  shipping pattern conditions.  These conditions,
along with the equilibrium price  solutions, are  given in table Al for the general  shipping
pattern  cases.
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